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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the institutional framework put in place by the Kenyan government for poverty reduction in the period 
2005-2007 in urban areas was inimical to participation, and thus not effective. The absence of sanction is the weakest element 
in the institutional framework. With the exception of the Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), accountability 
is limited in these frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the analysis shows that 
these are generally notional. The stakeholder involvement is extensively applied as a tool for citizen participation. This 
stakeholder model has limitations that in the end render the frameworks as adopted less than fully responsive to the demands 
of poverty alleviation. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper argues that the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction in the period 2005-2007 was 
inimical to participation, and thus not effective for poverty reduction. The absence of sanction is the weakest element in 
the institutional framework. With the exception of the Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), 
answerability is also limited in these frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the 
analysis shows that these are generally notional. The stakeholder involvement is extensively applied as a tool for citizen 
participation. This stakeholder model has limitations, - built-in exclusions, so that overall the frameworks are by design 
not aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens. 
The rest of this paper is organised in five parts. The next section examines the institutional framework at a national 
level and is followed by a discussion of the frameworks at the City of Nairobi level. The effectiveness of national 
institutional measures for poverty reduction such as the National Poverty Plan (1999) is presented in the fourth section. 
The paper then turns to the institutional framework of implementing the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plans 
(LASDAP) in Viwandani, and closes with a conclusion in the last section. 
 
2. The National Level Framework 
 
There are different legal and planning instruments that guide planning in Kenya. At the national level, planning is a hybrid 
of both cooperative (between government ministries or departments) and hierarchical systems. Most of the government 
departments have a planning responsibility set out in the legal instruments establishing the central government ministries. 
Whilst there are central government departments, much of the planning mandate is carried out at the local level in the 
districts through the District Development Plans. The Office of the President, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of 
Planning and Ministry of Finance are ‘super’ departments in an otherwise cooperative planning system as they operate 
elaborate network of branches throughout the country. 
There are several central government departments with clearly defined mandates for development: the Office of 
the President (OP), particularly the Provincial Administration, represents an unusual control of planning and development, 
and related decision-making in Kenya. The Provincial Administration has an elaborate link between the President and the 
citizens that typifies the relations between the state/President and citizens. The top-down relation between the citizen and 
the OP and the hierarchical nature of these relations are important features of this framework. This meticulous system of 
Provincial Administration has a two-fold mandate: implementing central government policies and decisions at the lowest 
level and to ensure internal security of the country (Akatch, 1992). 
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In many respects, the OP, through a detailed Provincial Administration system whose network stretches from the 
location in the villages to the Minister in the Office of the President, determines much of the planning direction in the 
country. Literature (for example Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996; Wanyande, 1996; 2005) shows that the Provincial Administration 
system has its origins in the Colonial government and provides an efficient system for ensuring law and order; but have 
also made law and order the raison d’être of planning, and allocation of land in the informal settlements. Other central 
government departments represented at the District level are not only responsible and accountable to the District 
Commissioner(s) but also to Officers of the Provincial Administration. Several legal frameworks provide the mandate for 
these departments to provide basic services critical in urban planning. Table 1 outlines these in some detail. 
 
Table 1. The Institutional Framework for Planning at the National Level, 2005-2007  
 
Ministry/Department Mandate/objective Planning Tools 
 
Ministry of Planning and 
National Development 
• Coordination of government economic policies including regional and international 
cooperation policies 
• Coordination and preparation of the planning components of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF); the Fiscal Strategy Paper and the requisite budget documents 
• Provision of leadership and coordination in the preparation of the national development 
plans, district development plans and specific economic programmes and plans 
• Coordination and management of population, economic and national statistical services 
within government 
• Coordination and provision of leadership in the national monitoring and evaluation 
framework 
• Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper 2001 – 2004 
• Economic Recovery Strategy 
2002/3 – 2008/9 
• Economic Recovery Strategy 
for Wealth and Employment 
Creation 2003 – 2007 
• Bureau of Statistics Strategic 
Plan 2003 – 2008 
• Industrialisation Policy Paper 
Ministry of Housing • Urban housing (Kenya Slum upgrading programme, rental housing, tenant purchase, 
mortgage housing programme, civil servants housing scheme) 
• Rural housing 
• Research 
• Building materials and technology 
• Financial resources 
• National Housing 
Development Programme 
2003 – 2007 
• Sessional Paper No.3 on 
national housing policy for 
Kenya 2004 
Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement 
• Ensure human settlements are well planned by providing an appropriate spatial framework 
within which environmental and socio-economic development activities can harmoniously 
take place. 
• Prepare national, regional physical development plans and policies (strategic, structure and 
zoning plans) 
• The Physical Planning Act 
1996 
• The National Land Policy 
Ministry of Regional 
Development 
• Planning economically on how to utilise the following regional developments: Coast 
Development Authority (CDA); Ewaso Ng’iro North Development Authority (ENNDA); Ewaso 
Ng’iro South Development Authority (ENSDA); Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA); 
Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA); Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority 
(TARDA) 
• Various Acts of Parliament 
• Ministry of Regional 
Development Strategic Plan 
2004 – 2009 
• National Policy for Regional 
Development 
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation 
• Accelerating the implementation of water sector reforms: sustainable management of water 
resources; provision of water and sewerage services, utilisation of land through irrigation 
and land reclamation; mobilising and promoting efficiency; management and access to water 
resource information 
• National Water Policy 
• Services Charter 
• Water Act 
• Irrigation Policy 
• Ministry of Water Strategic 
Plan 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
• Supporting service delivery, planning and development, local government reform, provision 
of physical and financial management and regulatory framework for local authorities 
• Local Authorities Policy 
• Local Government Act 
• Physical Planning Act 
• Local Authorities Transfer 
Fund Act 
• By-laws of Local Authorities 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
After the Office of the President and Treasury, the Ministry of Local Government is the third super ministry with direct 
connections with local level development. At the national level, the planning mandates require each of the departments to 
plan and implement activities at the local level. The main connection between the national level (i.e., Ministries) and the 
local level is through the Districts. Districts prepare District Development Plans and receive funding from the National 
Treasury to implement plans of different line ministries at the district. 
The Ministry of Planning and National Development has overall supervision of the District Development Plans and 
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the District Planning Officers. Moreover, the District Commissioner (DC) who is technically a representative of Central 
government and more so the President, is the head of the District responsible for all development and security in the 
district. In this role, the DC coordinates all development activities within the district with the support of District Officers and 
Chiefs. 
Although there are several institutions that have been established to address various aspects of urban planning; 
the great number of these institutions is the main weakness. A close scrutiny of the institutions at the national level shows 
that these are fragmented and makes urban planning impossible. Moreover, the power and influence of the OP and 
ministries of finance and local government mean that citizens do not have any influence on how decisions affecting them 
are made or even where resources are expended. 
 
3. The City of Nairobi Level 
 
The institutional framework for poverty reduction at the City of Nairobi level is unwieldy and rather complicated. In terms 
of politics, the city of Nairobi comprises eight constituencies and 56 wards (a constituency is a geopolitical area that is 
represented in parliament by an elected representative, i.e., a Member of Parliament (MP), whilst a ward is a geopolitical 
area represented in the City Council by an elected representative known as a Councillor) as shown in Table 2. At present, 
Nairobi is also one of the eight provinces in Kenya, namely: Central, Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley, North Eastern, Nyanza, 
Western and Nairobi provinces. However, with the promulgation of the current Constitution, Nairobi now also becomes 
one of the forty-seven counties in Kenya’s new devolved structure of government. But Nairobi is also the capital of Kenya 
and the headquarters of two United Nations agencies – the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United 
Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 
 
Table 2. Constituencies and Wards of Nairobi 
 
Constituency Wards
Dagoretti Waithaka; Mutuini; Riruta; Kawangware; Uthiru/Ruthimitu; Woodley/Kenyatta/Golf Course 
Embakasi Kariobangi South; Komarock; Mukuru; Savannah; Kayole; Umoja; Dandora A; Dandora B; Ruai; Njiru; 
Embakasi/Mihango 
Kamukunji Pumwani/Majengo; Eastleigh North; Eastleigh South; Shauri Moyo/Muthurwa; Kimathi; Uhuru 
Kasarani Kahawa West; Kariobangi North; Kasarani; Korogocho; Roysambu; Githurai; Mathare 4 A; Baba Dogo/Utalii 
Langata Mugumoini; Karen/Langata; Nairobi West; Laini Saba; Serangombe; Kibera
Makadara Viwandani; Harambee; Hamza; Kaloleni/Makongeni; Ofafa/Maringo; Nairobi South; Mbotela 
Starehe Ngara East; City Square/Central; Ziwani/Kariokor; Huruma; Mathare
Westlands Kitisuru/Loresho; Kileleshwa; Kilimani; Kangemi; Highridge; Parklands
 
Source: Nairobi City Council (2002) 
 
The Ministry of Local Government through its Urban Development department is mandated to coordinate urban 
development, including poverty reduction, by facilitating effective strategic development and sustainable delivery of 
infrastructure and social services by local authorities The Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development is also mandated 
to ensure integrated Nairobi Metropolitan Areas Growth and Development Strategy through its Vision 2030. The ministry 
also aims at improving governance via the system of creating an environment of certainty for private investment. Although 
measures are put in place to ensure that the institutional framework promotes active collaboration between different 
parties, including neighbouring areas, government spheres, private sector, and other stakeholders, the effect has been a 
complicated maze. Table 3 below identifies other actors, particularly at national level, in the framework at the City level. 
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Table 3. Institutional Framework for Local Development and Poverty Reduction in Nairobi 
 
Central Government 
through Line Ministries 
Poverty Eradication Fund (Ministry of 
Planning and National Development)
Office of the President through 
Provincial Administration 
LATF / 
LASDAP1 
Devolved Funds controlled 
by Member of Parliament 
National Treasury PS2 in the Ministry Office of the President MLG3 Member of Parliament 
PS in line ministries  Provincial commissioner PS  
District heads DPU/DDP4 District Commissioner KLGRP5  
Departmental projects Divisional Development Committee District Officer UDD6  
 Location Development Committee Chiefs City of 
Nairobi 
Constituency Development 
Committee 
  Assistant Chiefs Councillors  
  Village Head men Chief Officers  
   Ward 
Managers 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the City of Nairobi is also the capital of Kenya. Because of its political and economic significance, 
important political institutions of local/city, national and international scope are operational in Nairobi. This further 
complicates the institutional framework for poverty reduction. Of course there is the City Council of Nairobi that is 
mandated to develop and manage the city. However, operationally, there are significant complications when the 
institutional framework for poverty reduction is unravelled. Figure 1 shows the complex framework within which the City of 
Nairobi operates and responds to poverty. Although prepared 14 years ago, there have not been changes to the 
governance structure of Nairobi; such changes will only take effect after commencement of the County Government Act 
(2013). 
 
Figure 1. Governance Structure for Nairobi 
 
 
 
Source: Aligula (1999: 91). 
                                                                            
1 Local Authorities Transfer Fund / Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan(s) 
2 Permanent Secretary (the equivalent of the Director General in Republic of South Africa Government). 
3 Ministry of Local Government 
4 District Planning Unit / District Development Plan 
5 Kenya Local Government Reform Programme 
6 Urban Development Department in the Ministry of Local Government. 
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In a nutshell, apart from the interface between national frameworks and city level frameworks, the City of Nairobi also has 
an elaborate institutional framework. There are 16 departments in the City Council of Nairobi (CCN). Of these, the City 
Planning Department, the Environment Department, the City Engineering Department, the Housing Department, 
Education, the Social Services and Housing Department, and the Public Health Department are critical in poverty 
reduction. According to the Local Government Act (Cap. 265 of the laws of Kenya), a local authority such as the City of 
Nairobi is responsible for provision and management of services within its jurisdiction. 
The City Nairobi is faced by numerous challenges such as poor economic conditions, rapid population growth, and 
strict control by the Ministry of Local Government, political interference and poor management services. As a result, not 
only are the living conditions of the population deteriorating further but economic production is also being constrained. 
Lack of municipal services leaves the poor with no alternative except to buy water and electricity from private sources, 
ultimately leaving them to pay far more than the rich do for these services. 
As Figure 2 shows, from a political perspective, the highest unit of governance in the City of Nairobi is the Mayor. 
The Mayor, although a councillor, is elected by other councillors. Therefore, the Mayor also continues as councillor for a 
specific ward. Except for nominated councillors, all the others are elected via a general election. Although voters 
registered in various wards of City of Nairobi elect councillors, councillors elect the mayor, deputy mayor and chairmen of 
departments during special elections of the City Council of Nairobi. However, the Minister of local Government appoints 
the Town Clerk, the substantive chief executive of the City of Nairobi. The Town Clerk is a civil servant and essentially the 
most powerful individual in the city.  
 
Figure 2. Organisational Chart for the City Council of Nairobi 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2009. 
 
There is an overlap of frameworks on the one hand and the institutions that were created under those frameworks on the 
other hand, all of which are relevant for citizen participation in urban planning for poverty reduction. For example, there is 
an overlap of institutions created under the system of local government, institutions created under the structure of 
provincial administration, notably chiefs and assistant chiefs, and institutions created with the constituency (the electoral 
district) as the unit of reference. Nonetheless, even when Local Authorities (LA) are theoretically autonomous, the 
existence of an ubiquitous parallel structure of government in the Office of the President (OP)/Provincial Administration 
confirms the “super-ministry” label of the OP, and lends credence to the view that LAs’ interventions are invariably 
sanctioned by the OP. 
After the departure of President Moi in 2002, the incoming parliament argued strongly for increased control of 
development spending by members of parliament at constituency level, resulting in a proliferation of funds managed at 
constituency level and multiple structures managing these funds. This trend of directing development funding through 
MPs has done a lot to further weaken local governments (civic authorities) as relevant units of local planning. Before 
2002 the role of local government was eclipsed by that of the provincial administration due to the dominance of the 
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presidency, which meant by-passing local government and relying instead on the provincial administration structure under 
the Office of the President as the main channel for state interaction with citizens at the local level.7 The Kenya Local 
Government Reform Programme (KLGRP), set up in 1996, has been working toward implementing reforms that restore 
the relevance and credibility of the local government system. 
 
4. Assessing Interventions for Poverty Reduction 
 
The 1999 National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) and the PRSPs prepared with significant involvement of non-state 
actors like NGOs are key features of the attention poverty received in the 1990s. Moreover, the first poverty maps based 
on the 1999 National Population and Housing Census, showing the incidence of poverty, were collaboratively prepared 
by the government, the World Bank, the Society for International Development and the International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). This also triggered a sequence of equally influential studies on 
poverty and inequality in Kenya. 
The most notable of these studies was the Kenya Human Development Report of 2001 (UNDP, 2001) and the 
Society for International Development’s Pulling Apart SID, 2004) study on poverty and inequality. With such 
unprecedented attention to poverty at the national level, inequality and to some extent poverty reduction, momentum 
gathered to dominate the national political, perhaps even academic discourses and debates. With these developments, 
then, it would no doubt be agreed that poverty reduction was finally ‘mainstreamed’ in the national plans of Kenya. 
 
5. The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) 1999 - 2015 
 
While the powerful succeeded for at least 40 years in creating and sustaining an all-powerful imperial presidency, it may 
also be justifiable to argue that through power, the less powerful endured and after 40 years succeeded in pulling the 
imperial presidency apart. Although various forms of power impacted the institutional framework, three are conspicuous: 
power in things, power through mobilisation, and power as immanent (Cahill, 2008). But the birth of the second republic 
also ensured the re-birth of institutions that significantly reconfigured the institutional framework for poverty reduction. 
The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) not only attempted to understand the poverty problem but it also 
outlined suggestions for its eradication. Right from President Moi’s foreword to the plan, it was clear that the government 
acknowledged the problem of poverty ravaging the people of Kenya. 
The National Poverty Eradication Plan presents a framework on how we are going to tackle poverty that afflicts a 
large percentage of our people. My Government has been committed to poverty reduction as a key ingredient to building 
an economically strong and prosperous nation, with a cohesive society in which all have an opportunity to realise their full 
potential. It is out of this strong commitment that we have been able to make significant progress in the social sectors 
notably in education and health despite some recent slight setbacks arising from the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (Moi, 1999). 
The NPEP was also significant as a trailblazer for national planning that was specifically targeted at poverty 
eradication. In a significant departure from national development planning circumspection, the Plan admitted that poverty 
was a national crisis: 
Poverty reduction is a national challenge. Initially, Kenya hoped to eradicate it through economic growth. It was 
seen as a short-term hardship which would disappear as the nation developed and grew in economic terms. Poverty is 
now recognised as a major threat to a very significant section of Kenyan households; worrying follow-on consequences 
for the security and economic well-being of those with surplus income and good services. It is also increasingly 
recognised that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to reduce poverty (Republic of Kenya, 1999: 2). 
In terms of national planning, the NPEP was also innovative in several ways. First, it attempted a reflective 
evaluation of past interventions for development (ibid.: 4–11). The evaluation provided a sound basis for shifting 
intervention beyond simple economic growth objectives. Second, the government in this plan made another important 
admission: that National plans did not provide room to focus exclusively on poverty (ibid.: 5). In this plan the government 
also acknowledged the importance of civil society in any poverty reduction interventions. Hitherto, the private sector and 
the state were the only recognised actors in development and, to some extent, in poverty reduction. Third, even when the 
                                                                            
7 With the imminent changes and overhaul of the policy, legal and institutional frameworks for planning to fit the new constitution, all this 
is going to change significantly upon the full implementation of the Constitution (2010). All the same, at present, chiefs and assistant 
chiefs (and village headmen under them) remain an important part of provincial administration and are in cases the only manifestation of 
government. 
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government emphasised the need for economic growth, it also made another critical observation: 
While economic efficiency arguments may have dictated these actions, the benefits were not equitably shared. The 
introduction of cost-sharing and cost recovery arrangements in basic social services has worked against a great majority 
of poor groups. The quality of the services deteriorated and the resources were extremely limited (ibid.: 27). 
The above observation not only highlighted the policy effects of interventions that were based on the notion of 
absolute poverty. Economic efficiency was the dominant perspective, even perceived as a panacea for poverty reduction. 
Despite its negative effects and limitations, economic growth was nonetheless the path recommended. This suggests that 
it was a case of the lesser evil and there must be growth in the economy to be shared amongst the rich and the poor. In 
identifying the poor, the plan also made a distinction between rural and urban poverty, noting: “the incidence of poverty in 
Kenya was 47 per cent in the rural areas and 29 per cent in the urban areas” (ibid.). 
The main objective of the plan, however, was: “to achieve pro-poor growth and service delivery” (Republic of 
Kenya, 1999: xi). Box 1 shows the specific goals and targets of this plan. 
 
Box 1.Goals and Targets of the NPEP 
 
• Reduction of the poor in the total population by 20 per cent by 2004 and by a further 30 per cent by 2010 
• 15 per cent increase in [school] enrolment rates over the first six years of the Plan 
• 19 per cent increase in [schooling] completion rates, especially for girls in the six year period 
• Universal access to Primary Health care to within 5 kilometres of all rural households or within one hour of local transport by 
2010 
• Increase by 8 per cent each year until 2004 access to safe drinking water by poor households 
• By 2010, create universal access to safe water 
• Reduce time spent by women on fuel, wood and water collection 
• Publish ‘best practice’ guidelines for rural and urban social development by 2000 
• 20 per cent of communities to draw up action plans by 2004 
• 40 per cent of all extension messages to be relevant to very poor farmers 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 1999, p xiv. 
 
For the first time, the government also introduced hitherto unorthodox terms in planning. The plan included the Charter for 
Social Integration (CSI), produced by civil society, including social movements, outlining a range of basic rights that the 
government expressed a commitment to ensure all citizens enjoyed. These rights included literacy and numeracy, health, 
adequate food and clean water to maintain life, well-being and enthusiasm, and education (ibid.: 32). Evidently, the NPEP 
was comprehensive in its analysis of poverty and the strategies it proposed for its reduction. Unlike the other plans it was 
perceived as the interface between the National Development Plans and the needs of the poor. The CSI, the deliberate 
commitment to improve basic services to the poor and a pro-poor economic growth strategy underscored the NPEP’s 
relevance and breadth in terms of poverty reduction. 
The NPEP was to be implemented in three 5-year phases: 1999–2004; 2005–2010; and 2011–2015. Doubtless, 
the NPEP held much promise in the fight against poverty. In 2000, the Commission for Poverty Eradication (CPE) was 
established in the Office of the President. This was to be assisted by another body, the Poverty Eradication Unit (PEU). 
The CPE was expected to revive the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) approach and network. Community 
participation was a catch-phrase in government-speak during this time. 
Various funds, commonly known as decentralised/devolved funds, were established by the central government to 
improve interventions for poverty reduction. Table 4 presents a detailed analysis of the devolved funds in Kenya. These 
funds were an evident attempt to decentralise public expenditure and address poverty. Together, all the interventions 
mentioned above formed the broad institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction. 
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Table 4. Overview of the Devolved / Decentralised Funds 
 
Devolved Fund Important Features 
Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) 
 
 
• LATF allocation is 5 percent of the national income tax. Transferred from the Ministry of Local 
Government under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance to Local Authorities 
• 7.5 Billion shillings disbursed to local authorities in Financial Year 2006/2007 
Secondary School Education Bursary 
(SSEB) 
• Established by Presidential decrees in 1993/4 
• Supposed to provide a subsidy to the country’s poor and vulnerable groups 
• Allocations are dependent on the Ministry of Education’s annual provisions 
• From 2003/2004 Constituency Bursary Committees coordinate identification of beneficiaries 
• 1.4 Billion shillings released to the SSEB in the 2005/2006 Financial Year 
Roads Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF) • Established in 1993 through the Roads Maintenance Levy Fund Act 
• Managed by the Kenya Roads Board (KRB) (1999) 
• 16 per cent of these funds are applied on rural roads managed by the district roads committees and 
shared equally among constituencies in a district 
• 14 Billion shillings were disbursed to the KRB in the 2006/2007 Financial Year 
Rural Electrification Programme Levy Fund 
(REPLF) 
• Established in 1998 through sections 129 and 130 of the Electric Power Act (1997) 
• The fund is finance electricity in rural areas and other poorly served areas of the country 
Constituency Aids Control Fund (CACF) • Established by Presidential decree of 1999 contained in legal notice No. 170 
• At least 80 per cent of this fund is dependent on donor funding 
• Fund is managed by the National AIDS Control Council (NACC) 
• The fund received 14 Billion shillings in the 2006/2007 Financial Year 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) • Established in 2003 under the CDF Act 2003. 
• Administered by the National Management Committee 
• CDF comprises 2.5 percent of ordinary government revenue 
• The CDF received 10 Billion shillings in the 2006/2007 Financial Year 
Free Primary Education (FPE) • Established in January 2003 by a Presidential Order 
• It is managed under various regulations and provisions under the Ministry of Education and paid 
directly to schools 
• Each child is allocated 1,020 shillings per year 
• 7.8 Billion shillings disbursed in the 2005/2006 Financial Year 
Poverty Eradication Fund (PEF) • Established under the Ministry of Planning and National Development in 1999 
• The Fund is administered at the district level under the Poverty Eradication Commission 
• Loans are provided to individuals and small groups for income generation 
Youth Enterprise Fund • Established by Presidential Order in 2006 
• To be administered by the Ministry of Youth Affairs 
• Fund is aimed at supporting small to medium scale enterprise 
• 1 Billion shillings allocated in the 2006/2007 Financial Year 
Women’s Fund • Established by Presidential Order in 2007 
• 1 Billion shillings allocated in the 2007/2008 Financial Year 
Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) • Wholly funded by the European Union 
• Established in 1996 
• Aimed at poverty reduction through provision of grants to community based projects that address 
social, economic and environmental priorities 
• A community contribution is mandatory and is set at a minimum of 10 per cent – this may be in cash, 
labour or materials. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Hanns Seidel Foundation (2006) p.8-11 and author’s Fieldwork in 2007 
  
Beyond providing analysis of the numerous funds availed by the state for poverty reduction, Table 4 also shows the broad 
institutional response to poverty. However, the effectiveness of the above responses in reducing poverty is not known. 
For instance, as Table 5 shows, the Poverty Eradication Fund had received a paltry 161 million shillings since its 
inception. From the funds that the government allocated to the Poverty Eradication Fund, the government was evidently 
reluctant to engage with and/or promote planning for poverty reduction. 
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Table 5. Poverty Eradication Fund since 1999 
 
Financial Year Kenya Shillings (Millions)
1999/2000 22.0
2000/2001 11.4
2001/2002 57.0
2002/2003 36.0
2003/2004 35.0
2004/2005 0.0
2005/2006 0.0
Total 161.4
 
Source: National Council of Churches of Kenya (2005: 41) 
 
The ways in which the presidency was created and how it exercised extra-constitutional powers to stifle the 
independence of other institutions of government demonstrate the fact that power “…is not found in the resources, but in 
the use of those resources” (ibid.). Until 2010, the presidency was the most powerful institution in Kenya. As shown 
above, the power of the presidency was vested both in the resources it controlled and the manner in which these 
resources were deployed. In the use of these resources as Ghai and Ghai (undated:8) show, “…corruption drained away 
billions of shillings which belonged to the state…” resulting in more poverty. Thus, the use of this power shows the 
creation of relative powerfulness of the presidency and the relative powerlessness of the poor. 
 
6. The Institutional Framework for Implementing the LASDAP 
 
The range of actors and their relationships to one another shows the complexity of the institutional framework within 
which the LASDAP was implemented. These actors include the citizens, officials of the City of Nairobi, and officials of the 
central government, particularly those from the Ministry of Local Government (MLG), professionals; others are drawn 
from the private sector and various civil society organisations. Although implemented at the city and sub-city levels, the 
rules for implementing the LASDAP were largely established by the Minstry of Local Government and central government 
in general. Figure 3 shows how the MLG envisioned the LASDAP. 
 
Figure 3. Summarised LASDAP Process 
 
 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 2005:4 
 
While the central government set out what the LASDAP entails operationally, it was the City of Nairobi that dominated the 
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relations among the various actors involved in the LASDAP. Table 6 gives one dimension of these relations. My 
discussions with various actors show that with the exception of the consultation phase that had a token presence of 
citizens and civil society organisations, the City of Nairobi has dominated and virtually excluded the citizens in the rest of 
the phases. The City was able to dominate the LASDAP through a combination of condign and compensatory power 
(Galbriath, 1983). Hence, as Putnam (1993) would argue, the above is an illustrative case of how institutions shape the 
behaviour of actors. Since the City retained all decision-making power, and the poor and other citizens relied upon 
invitations to participate, it is understandable that actors in the City were invariably inclined to exclude citizens whilst 
tinkering at the edges of the status quo. 
 
Table 6. Key Actors in the Main Phases of the LASDAP in Nairobi 
 
Main Phases Time Key Actors
Preparation August LASDAP Desk Officer, City Treasurer, LASDAP Technical Committee, LASDAP Committee 
Consultation / 
Consensus 
September / 
October 
Citizens from wards, Councillors, LASDAP Desk Officer, LASDAP Technical Committee, CBOs, 
NGOs, Religious organisations 
Finalisation / 
Submission November 
LASDAP Desk Officer, City Treasurer, LASDAP Technical Committee, LASDAP Committee, 
Full Council, Town Clerk 
Implementation / 
Monitoring Continuous 
LASDAP Desk Officer, City Treasurer, LASDAP Technical Committee, LASDAP Committee, 
Councillors, Contractor, Procurement, Town Clerk, Tender Committee, Internal Audit 
 
Source: Field Studies (2005–2007). 
 
For instance, from the accounts I received during the field studies the LASDAP Technical Committee was essentially 
comprised of chief officers (or heads of department of the City of Nairobi). From the analysis of the key actors who were 
involved in the LASDAP at each stage as shown in Table 6 above, it was unlikely that with a dominant City that crowded 
out citizens, the same supported participation and accountability. Even though the City seemed to dominate, it was 
indeed a few actors such as the Town Clerk, heads of departments and powerful politicians who dominated these 
relations and the institutional framework at the city and sub-city level. 
 
Figure 4. Organisational Structure for Planning and Implementation of the LASDAP 
 
 
Source: LASDAP Desk, 2007 
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Figure 4 above shows the details of the organisational structure, which was supposed to guide the planning and 
implementation of the LASDAP. From the organisational structure presented in Figure 4, it is apparent that the City had a 
hierarchical top-down structure to plan and implement the LASDAP. But, again, it was not always clear whether the 
structure guided implementation and the City significantly complied with the same.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction in this paper yields a mixed picture. 
The last 90 years of resistance against oppression by the government and struggle for change demonstrate the 
usefulness of power through mobilisation in changing unequal power relations and empowering previously powerless 
citizens. Regarding the ways in which the institutional framework affects citizen participation, it is clear that the 
stakeholder involvement is extensively applied as a tool for citizen participation. This stakeholder model has limitations; 
its in-built exclusions have been discussed. Secondly, concerning the mechanisms for accountability it is fair to say that 
overall the frameworks are by design not aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens. 
The absence of sanction is the weakest element in the institutional framework. With the exception of the EMCA, 
answerability is also limited in these frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the 
analysis shows that these are generally notional. Finally, regarding the way power impacts participation and 
accountability in the institutional frameworks, the analysis shows the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty 
reduction is not supportive of citizen participation and does not enhance accountability. 
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